Bladed weapons in the military art and tactics of the Crimean Khanate (15th–17th centuries)

Abstract

Abstract. The article examines the cold bladed weapons of the Crimean Khanate army, namely sabers. The peculiarities of the tactics of the Crimean Tatars, which were dictated by the available offensive weapons, are analyzed, with an emphasis on close combat and the use of bladed weapons. The peculiarities of the use of sabers by Crimeans on the battlefield in the 15th–17th centuries are highlighted. The purpose of the study is to comprehensively consider bladed weapons (sabers) in the military art of the Crimeans, their use on the battlefield and the peculiarities of tactics in the 15th–17th centuries, through the prism of contemporary sources and a mass of modern research literature. The scientific novelty lies in the fact that for the first time in domestic historiography an attempt has been made to comprehensively study bladed weapons as the main weapon of the Crimeans in close combat, using the example of individual battles and to analyze the peculiarities of its tactical use in military clashes and campaigns. The advantages of this type of weapon are described, as the weaponry influenced the tactics and course of military clashes. Conclusions. The author proves that sabers were the main weapon of the Crimeans in close combat, although in terms of numbers they were inferior to bows, since the Crimeans preferred distance combat and constant maneuvering. Close combat carried great risks for the light cavalry of the Tatars, which did not have powerful armor, therefore, mainly, the Crimeans entered into saber combat if they finished off the enemy (after massive fire from bows), broke into his camp or attacked from ambushes. For example, the use of sabers when finishing off the enemy in the Battle of Solhat (1434), when the army of the Genoese Republic was defeated, was illustrative. Crimean cavalry used sabers to finish off the Nogais at the Battle of Perekop in 1548, after the nomads had suffered losses from the fire of small arms and artillery of the Khanate. In 1659, near Konotop, having a numerical advantage, the Crimean Tatars ambushed the detachment of Prince Semyon Pozharsky and almost completely slaughtered them. In the battles of Tsetsora (1595) and Slobodysh (1660), the Tatars probably used a “deceptive retreat” to lure the enemy into open terrain and cut him down with sabers. It is obvious that the Tatars resorted to close combat and used sabers taking into account the circumstances, primarily the number of enemy troops and their condition.