Sociocultural transformations in Ukraine under the conditions of the Russian Federation’s full-scale military invasion
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Abstract. This study is devoted to the analysis of sociocultural transformations in Ukraine under the influence of the full-scale military invasion by the Russian Federation. The purpose of the research is to determine the nature and factors of such transformations while forecasting their possible consequences in the short and long term. The scientific novelty lies in a comprehensive understanding of the impact of the Russian military invasion on the dynamics of Ukraine’s sociocultural environment. The originality of the study is defined by the problem statement and the nature of the scientific search aimed at forming verified conclusions regarding the dynamics of Ukraine’s sociocultural environment under the influence of full-scale war. Conclusions. The full-scale military invasion of the Russian Federation has shaped a demand within Ukrainian society to escape the influence of the Russian cultural environment. This demand was driven by a negative attitude towards everything that, in the opinion of citizens, could be associated with the aggressor. Volunteer and social movements became widespread, fueled by the realization of the existential nature of the confrontation with the aggressor for Ukraine. At the same time, there was a significant increase in the public demand for justice, which in wartime conditions is based on a responsible attitude towards defenders, trust in the state, respect for human rights, protection of war victims, and a balanced distribution of resources. However, due to errors and miscalculations in the formation of the state development strategy regarding the predicted duration of the military confrontation and the nature of the armed struggle, as well as the persistence of corrupt practices during the war, the level of distrust in the government has significantly increased. This may negatively affect the implementation of several important and necessary, yet unpopular, decisions.
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