Strategies and practices to counter destructive information influences during a full-scale military invasion by the Russian Federation
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Abstract
Abstract. The purpose. It has been established that, under the conditions of the full-scale military invasion by the Russian Federation, the enemy’s destructive information influences serve as a tool for implementing the Russian Federation’s strategic plans aimed at eliminating Ukrainian statehood and nationhood. The scientific novelty. It is highlighted that the joint efforts of the state and civil society have succeeded in spreading among Ukrainian citizens the conviction that the current Russian-Ukrainian war constitutes an existential confrontation for Ukraine. It has been proven that the prolonged dissemination of information through influencers close to the authorities has led to growing distrust toward those authorities, against the backdrop of discrepancies between the government’s promises and their actual implementation. This distrust has increased amid the spread of populist slogans and messages by a number of pro-government «experts» who demonstrated an inability to form realistic forecasts, a lack of readiness to objectively assess events on the front lines, the scale and nature of foreign aid, as well as an unwillingness to link the provision of such aid to specific pre-determined actions by the Ukrainian authorities aimed at combating manifestations of corruption. The conclusions. It has been determined that cooperation between certain bloggers and individual state bodies has, to some extent, facilitated the process of exchanging prisoners of war, contributed to debunking a number of fakes spread by Russian propaganda, and shed light on the real motivation of Russian servicemen for participating in the war against Ukraine – a motivation based not on ideological convictions but primarily on material and financial incentives. It has been established that increasing the population’s media literacy on its own cannot ensure success in countering hostile destructive information influences without an effective and well-considered strategic communication policy.
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References
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