Construction of strategy for international relations by creatives of the Second Polish Republic

Abstract

Abstract

Abstract. Introduction. In the context of solution, course, and eventually end of the First World War, the leaders of the most important Polish political forces several times changed the strategy of attitude towards the main neighboring countries – Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. After all, these neighbors at one time destroyed the Polish statehood, and at that time – sought to draw the Poles into an orbit of their own political interests. Instead, the Poles understood that the unleashed world war gave a real chance to restore their own statehood, and this was the aim that all their steps in the field of international relations were subordinated to. Characteristically, the leaders of the two leading political forces then, Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski, took the opposite positions on a feasible strategic partnership, relying respectively: the first, at the beginning – on Russia (and later on the Triple Entente countries) and the second one – on Austria-Hungary.

Purpose. Naturally, there is a problem of finding a more appropriate position, a correctly chosen strategy, which ultimately allowed to realize the set goal.

Results. The analysis carried out convincingly proves that under those circumstances, as they were in the early twentieth century and during the course of the First World War, it was most appropriate to have exactly two strategically opposed positions. What really happened. Under such conditions, any strategy would in any case ensure success. R. Dmowski, whose strategy led the Poles to the status of the winners on the results of the First World, following the national interests of Poland, at the Paris Peace Conference completely mitigate the fault of those compatriots who, with the leadership of J. Piłsudski, collaborated with the camp of aggressors who were defeated in the war. Moreover, it was J. Piłsudski, who received all the laurels of hero of the restored Polish state, since the Poles associated the collection of historical Eastern Kresy lands with him. Instead, R. Dmovski, having raised with his statements ambitions among the Polish society about borders restoration of the former Commonwealth, in reality, signed in Paris a document that only Eastern Galicia joined in Poland.

Conclusion. Despite the myth created by J. Piłsudski in Polish historiography, allegedly a supporter of a federative model of relations with peoples in the Eastern Kresy (Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians), in his real political activity, he behaved in full accordance with the tactics promoted by R. Dmovski of the neighbors incorporation and their quench. In the end, as the events of further history proved, the implementation of restoration concept of so-called Eastern Kresy did not in fact correspond to interests of the restored Polish state, and this was particularly evident in the events of black for Poles September in 1939.